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1. Introduction  
efore establishing its modern-day National Reserve Bank, Tonga had 
a Board of Commissioners of Currency from 1935 to 1989 and, in 
addition, a Board of Commissioners of Coinage from 1962 to 1989. 
There are few works concerning Tonga’s exchange rate regime or monetary 
policy during this time; thus, the analysis here will rely mostly upon British 
colonial reports and Tongan government gazettes published during the 
aforementioned years. This paper analyzes Tonga’s currency board system 
based on statistical tests and examination of laws. The primary analysis 
uses data from the Commissioners of Currency/Coinage balance sheet, 
found in the colonial annual reports and gazettes. 
The Tongan government first issued notes during 1919 (Tonga Annual 
Report 1931: 20), but the statistical analysis in this paper will only start with 
1933 because earlier data were unavailable. In addition, data are 
unavailable from 1941-1946, because of problems connected with World 
War II. The holistic analysis will technically begin in 1919, despite the 
Board of Commissioners of Currency not being official established until 
1935. 
The focus of this paper is to investigate the extent of the orthodoxy of 
the Tongan Board of Commissioners of Currency through statistical 
analysis and testing. The paper will touch on other aspects of the Tongan 
monetary system for purposes of reference rather than analysis. In 
addition, other researchers may find useful the data on the Tongan 
monetary system available in the accompanying spreadsheet workbook. 
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2. Origins 
The Kingdom of Tonga is the southernmost archipelago among a group 
of islands in Polynesia. The kingdom is comprised of the primary islands of 
Tongatabu, Vavua, and Haabai, along with smaller islands. The first 
European to discover the primary islands was the Dutch navigator Abel 
Tasman in 1643. Then, 130 years later, the kingdom was visited by Captain 
James Cook, who deemed the archipelago “the Friendly Islands” due to the 
kind demeanor of the local people. In 1900, Tonga became a British 
protectorate. At the time, the great powers were carving out spheres of 
influence in the Pacific islands that they did not already own. Accepting 
British protection was likely the course that preserved the greatest local 
autonomy for Tonga. Britain took control of all subjects connected to the 
foreign relations of Tonga and exercised considerable though informal 
influence in local affairs. A British Agent and Consul were appointed to 
advise the Tongan government on financial matters. 
As previously mentioned, the Tongan government first issued bank 
notes during 1919. I have not found the text of the act, but based on acts 
concerning note issuance in other British colonies and protectorates at the 
time, I suspect that the Tongan act left many points to administrative 
discretion and was less specific than the successor 1935 act discussed 
below. The reason for initially issuing Tongan notes is presently unknown, 
but it could have arisen both from a desire to capture seigniorage for the 
Tongan government and to provide an alternative to silver coins. A jump in 
the world market price of silver made the metallic value of some silver 
coins greater than their face value, leading to the public withdrawing them 
from circulation and melting them. After first issuing notes, the Tongan 
government backed its notes with British and Australian denominated 
assets. Using British and Australian assets made sense, because the 
aforesaid countries’ respective currencies had been recognized as legal 
tender in Tonga since 1906 (Tonga Annual Report 1931: 20). When the notes 
were issued during 1919, the going exchange rates were Tongan £1 = £1 
sterling = £1 Australian. In addition to having one-to-one exchange rates, 
Tonga used the same pounds-shilling-pence structure that Great Britain 
and Australia had, in which £1 = 20 shillings = 240 pence (Krus & Schuler, 
2014: 233). Notes were issued for as little as 4 shillings, a denomination 
perhaps chosen because the value was close to 1 U.S. dollar and to the 
Spanish silver dollar from which the U.S. dollar had originated. Since the 
1600s the Spanish silver dollar had been widely used in and around the 
Pacific. 
During January 1926, the Government Savings Bank of Tonga was 
established (Tonga Annual Report 1926: 4). The Government Savings Bank 
was the first bank in Tonga. It stored deposits and facilitated withdrawals 
for the Tongan people (Tonga Annual Report 1927: 4). By the end of 1931, 
there were 403 Tongan depositors and 160 depositors from abroad, as well 
as £26,459 in credit of depositors (Tonga Annual Report 1931: 19). The 
Tongan Government Savings Bank continued to grow, and by 1963, it had 
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9,413 total depositors with a total deposits of £248,467 (Tonga Annual 
Report 1963). The first commercial bank established in Tonga was the Bank 
of Tonga, which was headquartered in Nuku’alofa, Tongatapu. This bank 
was founded during 1974 and was still the only commercial bank in Tonga 
by 1989, when the National Reserve Bank of Tonga replaced the 
Commissioners of Currency (Krus & Schuler, 2014: 234). 
During 1935, the Treasury Notes Act was passed. The act officially 
established the Board of Commissioners of Currency (henceforth known as 
“the Board” or “Commissioners of Currency”) (Treasury Notes Act, 1936). 
According to the Treasury Notes Act, the Commissioners of Currency 
would be comprised of the Premier, Treasurer, and one other individual 
nominated by the Privy Council. Furthermore, the Board was to have an 
office in the capital city of Nuku’alofa, Tongatapu, like the Government 
Savings Bank. The office of the Commissioners of Currency was permitted 
to hire various officers, agents, and other workers as needed, pending the 
approval of the Privy Council. 
The Treasury Notes Act gave the Commissioners of Currency the right 
to adjust the Tongan exchange rate system. Utilizing this ability, the 
Commissioners of Currency decided to fix the Tongan pound to the 
Australian pound (Tonga Annual Report 1935: 22). The rationale for the act 
seems to have been that Tonga’s economic ties to Australia were stronger 
than its ties to Britain. By this time, the Australian pound had been 
devalued against the pound sterling as a result of the strains of the Great 
Depression. It took 1.25 Australian pounds to buy a pound sterling. It is 
possible that from the time the Australian pound began to depreciate 
against the pound sterling in 1929, the Tongan pound in practice followed 
the Australian pound.  
In accordance with the powers granted to them under the Treasury 
Notes Act, the Commissioners of Currency fixed the minimum sum of 
currency it would exchange at £2,000. Funds could be left with the Bank of 
New Zealand, a commercial bank in that country, or the Bank of Sydney, 
an Australian bank. The Commissioners also set their commission rate for 
exchanging currency at 1.5 percent, so somebody exchanging Australian 
£2,000 would receive Tongan £1,970 in notes from the Commissioners 
(Tongan government gazette, February 2, 1936: 5). 
During the Second World War, the British government did not publish 
colonial annual reports, and we presently lack records from 1941-1946. 
Although we do not have much access to local financial information during 
this time, there are readily available accounts of Tonga’s role in the War. In 
proportion to its size, Tonga contributed much to the British government 
and the Allied powers. Tonga donated three Spitfire Supermarine aircraft 
and 2,700 soldiers from the Tonga Defense Force to aid the Allies 
(Rutherford 1977: 201). Furthermore, Tonga accommodated 10,000 United 
States troops during 1942. Another interesting contribution came from the 
Tongan public servants, as all government officials donated 10 percent of 
their salary to the British government’s war efforts. Tonga played a small 
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but respectable role in the Allies’ victory of the Second World War. It was 
sufficiently far from Japan that it was not invaded by Japanese forces. 
Tonga maintained a fairly limited amount of notes in circulation during 
the Commissioners of Currency’s first twenty years. At the end of 1939, 
there were only £20,073 worth of notes in circulation compared to the 
£20,000 in circulation during 1924 (Tonga Annual Report 1924: 3). By 1946, 
the value of notes in circulation had made a substantial increase to £85,690; 
however, the biggest increases were yet to come. By the end of 1959, the 
value of notes in circulation was £280,747.90. That means that in 20 years, 
the value of notes in circulation increased by almost fourteen-fold. The 
substantial increase in value can be attributed to rising prices and increased 
production of Tonga’s main export, copra (Tonga Annual Report 1959: 16). 
It also may be the case that sectors of the economy where monetary 
exchange was initially limited became fully monetized during the period. 
Near the end of 1957, the Tongan government began to consider the 
establishment of a Tongan coinage and movement to a decimal currency 
(Tonga Annual Report 1957: 15). The impetus for creating a Tongan coin 
arose from the heterogeneity of foreign coinage. Australian and British 
coinage had been legal tender in Tonga since 1906; during the Second 
World War, coins from Fiji and New Zealand had also filtered into the 
general circulation (Tonga Annual Report 1957: 15). During 1962, the 
Legislative Assembly passed the Tonga Coinage Act, which allowed the 
issuance of gold coins (Tonga Annual Report 1963: 42). On April 22, 1963, 
under the authority established by the Coinage Act of 1962, a series of gold 
coins memorializing the centenary of emancipation (the end of serfdom as 
a legal institution) were issued by the Tongan Commissioners of Coinage 
(Tonga, Minister of Finance Report 1963: 5). The gold coins were the first 
ever issued by Tonga and in fact the first issued within Polynesia. There 
were three types of gold coins: the Koula (twenty units), the Half Koula 
(ten units), and the Quarter Koula (five units). The coins were minted in 
both a regular circulation series and a proof series, consisting of 10,800 
coins and 1,050 coins, respectively. By December 1963, the value of gold 
coins in circulation was £102,180; furthermore, the Coinage Security Fund, 
which held the assets that backed up the coins in circulation, was valued at 
£108,217. The circulation of gold coins was unusual for the time; almost 
everywhere else, gold coins had gone out of circulation by the Second 
World War. 
Shortly after the establishment of the Tongan Commissioners of 
Coinage, the Tongan government moved forward with its plans to establish 
a decimal currency system. During 1965, the government reached an 
agreement that the decimalization would be effective for Tonga; thus, a 
change-over date was recognized for 1966 (Tonga Minister of Finance 
Report 1965: 7). In February 1966, the Assistant Treasurer of Tonga met 
with members of decimal currency committees from New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom to oversee the Australian transition to a decimal currency 
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system (Tonga Minister of Finance Report 1966: 7). Tonga then decimalized 
on the same day as Australia, February 14, 1966.  
Tonga’s decimalization led the way to a new currency, the Pa’anga. The 
call for a new currency was a direct result of an Australian change in 
currency and switch to decimalization. Both currencies shifted from the 
pounds-shillings-pence system to the decimalized system and consequently 
created the Tongan Pa’anga and Australian dollar. The Pa’anga could be 
divided into 100 parts, which in the simplest form was a Seniti (Tonga 
Minister of Finance Report 1966: 7), similar to a U.S. penny. The 
denominations of the Pa’anga in notes were ten, five, two, one, and one-
half Pa’anga, and in coins, one Pa’anga and 50, 20, 10, 5, 2, and 1 Seniti. 
Accompanying these new currencies and denominations were new 
exchange rates. After both countries decimalized, the exchange rate was 1 
Tongan Pa’anga = 1 Australian dollar (Krus & Schuler, 2014: 233). 
Furthermore, since the old currency was still in circulation, the exchange 
rate of new to old Tongan currency was 2 Tongan Pa’anga = Tongan £1. It 
was reported though that by the end of 1967, 93.23 percent of the Tongan 
pounds outstanding had been exchanged through the nation’s treasury 
(Tonga Minister of Finance Report 1967: 7).  
During 1988, the Tongan Legislative Assembly passed the National 
Reserve Bank of Tonga Act. This legislation replaced the Board of 
Commissioners of Currency/Coinage with a central bank, the National 
Reserve Bank of Tonga (Krus & Schuler 2014: 233). The system change was 
made so that Tonga could have more freedom with its monetary policy.  
A central banking authority and floating exchange rate offers monetary 
autonomy that an orthodox currency board does not. For example, a central 
bank is a lender to financial institutions. To control the money supply, a 
central bank changes the interest rate that it charges to financial institutions 
that borrow from it. A central bank’s ability to change the money supply 
gives it economic influence through monetary policy, which allows the 
bank to either stimulate or contract the economy. An orthodox currency 
board, unlike a central bank, does not lend to financial institutions or the 
government and therefore has no borrowing rate to affect the money 
supply. This is the crux of a currency board’s effectiveness in maintaining a 
fixed rate with its anchor currency, for the government can not rely on the 
central bank to print more money. A currency board fosters government 
monetary responsibility and thus aids in controlling inflation.  
 
3. To what extent was the board of commissioners of 
currency an orthodox currency board? 
To evaluate whether or not the Tongan Board of Commissioners of 
Currency acted as an orthodox currency board, we must specify the 
qualities and functions of an orthodox currency board. The fundamental 
features include: issuing notes and coins that can be converted without 
restriction into a foreign anchor currency at a fixed exchange rate and a 
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monetary base (liabilities) backed 100 percent or slightly more by foreign 
assets, such as low-risk bonds in the anchor currency or gold (Hanke, 2002: 
88). The main purpose of a currency board is to stabilize a country’s 
currency by limiting the scope for discretionary monetary policy. So, to 
what extent did Commissioners of Currency act as a currency board? 
One characteristic of a currency board is that the domestic currency 
maintains a fixed exchange rate against an anchor currency. As previously 
stated, Tongan currency kept a fixed exchange rate against Australian 
currency for the entire lifetime of the Commissioners of Currency.  Tonga 
even decimalized its currency on the same day that Australia abandoned 
the pounds-shilling-pence system. Thus, the Tongan Commissioners of 
Currency satisfied this requirement of currency board orthodoxy. 
To determine whether the Tongan Commissioners of Currency met 
other standards of orthodoxy, we will develop statistical tests. We have 
compiled and digitized data by way of Tongan government gazettes and 
Tongan colonial annual reports. Our tests utilize balance sheet analysis of 
both the Commissioners of Currency and later the Commissioners of 
Coinage once it was established. The data go back to 1933, with one major 
gap between 1941 and 1949 and scattered other missing years. Until 1936, 
statements were issued quarterly. Semiannual reports were then made until 
1954 and finally annual statements until the Commissioners of Currency 
ceased. The data used for these tests are available in the accompanying 
spreadsheet workbook. 
Many of the balance sheets for the Tonga Commissioners of Currency 
published in the Tongan government gazettes and annual reports did not 
have assets equal to liabilities. After the Commissioners of Coinage were 
created, there were two separate balance sheets, one for notes and one for 
coins. These separate balance sheets both still did not balance. The reason 
may have been that the balance sheets would have balanced without 
requiring a net worth term had securities been valued at cost, but the 
securities were carried on the balance sheet at market value without any 
corresponding net worth term. To address this issue, we have added a net 
worth term to balance the otherwise unbalanced balance sheet. When there 
are more liabilities than assets, there is a negative net worth, and when 
assets exceed liabilities, there is a positive net worth. Substantial negative 
net worth, exceeding say 5 percent of total assets, means that the monetary 
authority is not a truly orthodox currency board, because foreign assets are 
not close to 100 percent of the monetary base.  
 
3.1. Test one: Foreign assets, domestic assets, and monetary base 
The first statistical test in this analysis is net foreign assets as a 
percentage of the monetary base (liabilities), shown in Figure 1. As 
previously stated, an orthodox currency board will back its monetary base 
with 100 percent or slightly more net foreign assets. However, a clause 
from the Treasury Notes Act established that foreign reserves only had to 
back 75 percent of the monetary base (Skully, 1987: 163), although the 
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Commissioners of Currency were free to hold a higher ratio. The next 
statistical test in this analysis is net domestic assets as a percentage of the 
monetary base (liabilities), shown in Figure 2. An orthodox currency board 
will hold zero net domestic assets or a number relatively close to zero. In 
the event that a meaningful amount of domestic assets back up the 
monetary base, a faltering domestic economy can substantially reduce their 
value, harming the currency board’s ability to facilitate immediate liquidity 
of currency exchange between the domestic and anchor currency. Backing 
the monetary base with foreign assets allows the currency board to prevent 
liquidity issues when its country’s economy or assets are faltering. 
Figure 1 shows a continuous chart (closing gaps between missing years 
of data) of the Tongan Commissioners of Currency’s foreign assets as a 
percentage of its monetary base. The Commissioners of Currency initially 
operated in orthodox currency board fashion for all but a couple of years 
from 1933 to 1966, maintaining an average foreign asset ratio exceeding 99 
percent during that period. However, after 1966 the percentage dropped 
and stayed below 80 percent, and at times below 60 percent, for the 
remainder of the existence of the Commissioners of Currency. The sharp 
turn away from currency board orthodoxy came after Tonga and Australia 
decimalized and created new currencies, though there was no necessary 
connection between decimalization and the change in monetary policy. The 
only time that the percentage exceeded 100 percent was in 1979, when 
silver bullion appreciated sharply. This first test provides evidence that 
Tonga’s Commissioners of Currency may have operated as an orthodox 
currency board until 1966; however, the case for currency board orthodoxy 
after 1966 is practically eliminated, because of how low the percentage 
drops and remains. 
Figure 2 shows a continuous chart of the Commissioners of Currency’s 
domestic assets as a percentage of the monetary base. Figure 2 mostly 
supports the conclusion derived from Figure 1. The Commissioners of 
Currency held domestic assets for most of their existence. As previously 
stated, an orthodox currency board will hold zero or very little in domestic 
assets. Our test shows that the Commissioners of Currency held zero 
domestic assets during the early 1930s but saw an increase in domestic 
assets by the time of the Second World War. It is possible that conditions 
after Japan started the war in the Pacific made the acquisition of foreign 
assets more difficult, leading to a bump up in domestic assets. Domestic 
assets then stayed at around 5-10 percent of the monetary base for the 20 
following years, though, suggesting a fairly but not completely orthodox 
currency board. Figure 2 again shows a major deviation from orthodoxy 
after the Tongan currency system decimalized in 1966. Domestic assets as a 
percentage of the monetary base soared to over 40 percent and stayed 
between 30-40 percent for most of the remaining life of the Commissioners 
of Currency. Once again, the argument for an orthodox currency board 
after 1966 is practically dead on arrival.  
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Figure 1. Foreign assets as a percentage of the monetary base 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Domestic assets as a percentage of the monetary base 
 
3.2. Test two: Reserve pass-through 
Our second test analyzes the reserve pass-through of the Tongan 
Commissioners of Currency. Reserve pass-through is the year-over-year 
change in monetary base divided by the year-over-year change in net 
foreign assets. In an orthodox currency board, reserve pass-through should 
theoretically be 100 percent, but given certain difficulties in measurement, 
more realistically a range of 80-120 percent seems reasonable (Hanke, 2008: 
280). The percentage should be near 100 percent because changes in 
monetary base should be directly related to the public’s purchases and 
sales of foreign currency in exchange for domestic currency.  
Figure 3 displays a continuous chart of the Tongan Commissioners of 
Currency’s reserve pass-through ratio. The ratio was highly volatile from 
start to finish. It generally remained between -400 percent and +400 percent 
and never stayed at or around 100 percent for more than a year or two. 
This, once again, is a deviation from currency board orthodoxy. When 
considering the results of Test One, the volatility of the reserve pass-
through ratio makes sense. Because the monetary base was not backed in 
an orthodox currency board manner, the reserve pass-through ratio did not 
adhere to orthodox currency board standards. Furthermore, the large 
percentage of domestic assets likely threw off the reserve pass-through 
ratio. As the monetary base changed, both domestic and foreign assets 
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changed, whereas with an orthodox board, basically only foreign assets 
should have mimicked the changes in the monetary base.  
 
 
Figure 3. Reserve pass-through year-over-year percentage 
 
3.3. Test three: Changes in monetary base and foreign assets 
Our third test analyzes the year over year changes of the Tongan 
Commissioners of Currency’s monetary base and net foreign assets. In an 
orthodox currency board, changes in foreign assets and changes in the 
monetary base should go hand in hand (Hanke, 2008). For example, if 
foreign assets rise by £10,000, then the monetary base should also increase 
by approximately £10,000. (In practice, the timing of interest earnings, 
commission fees, and expenses usually adds some noise to the data, but not 
enough to undermine the usefulness of the test.) Observing the changes in 
monetary base and foreign assets can also help us have a better 
understanding of the reserve pass-through ratio, because they represent the 
specific changes from which the reserve pass-through ratio is derived.  
Figures 4A and 4B show the year-over-year changes in both the 
monetary base and net foreign assets for the Tongan Commissioners of 
Currency. Figure 4A shows data from 1934 to 1966, whereas Figure 4B only 
shows data from 1966 to 1986. We have created two charts to magnify the 
monetary base and foreign asset changes of earlier years; moreover, the 
two charts allow a comparison between the earlier and later years of the 
Commissioners of Currency. The charts only consider data capable of being 
measured in a year over year fashion and is constructed in a continuous 
manner. The charts’ “discrete” versions, showing all the gaps in data, are 
available in the accompanying spreadsheet workbook. 
Figure 4B gives a look at the changes in monetary base and foreign 
assets from 1934 to 1966. In many years, the monetary base and foreign 
assets changed in line with one another or close to it. Furthermore, in many 
cases of deviation, changes in foreign assets outpaced the changes in 
monetary base, which signals that the foreign assets are increasing at a 
faster rate relative to the monetary base that they are backing up. Between 
1934 and 1966 the changes are reasonably correlated, at 0.86. Because of the 
somewhat close correlation between the changes, the reserve pass-through 
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test’s implications can be slightly mitigated. However, there are still 
notable deviations between the changes in monetary base and changes in 
foreign assets, leading to a questionable claim of orthodoxy for the 
Commissioners of Currency when analyzing only Figure 4B. 
Figure 4A, on the other hand, calls for vetting the changes in monetary 
base compared with the changes in foreign assets. Figure 4A covers the 
changes from 1966 to 1986, ending near the close of the existence of the 
Commissioners of Currency. The correlation plunges to 0.34. This indicates 
a major deviation from orthodoxy as the changes are not moving in line 
with one another. One caveat to this is again the appreciation of silver 
bullion during 1979, which created major changes in both the monetary 
base and foreign assets. Regardless of this specific event, the accounts’ 
changes relative to one another are not characteristic of an orthodox 
currency board. In conclusion, there is a possible case for orthodoxy from 
the beginning until around the time of decimalization; however, monetary 
base and foreign asset changes began to diverge distinctly soon after. For 
the most part, Test Three supports the findings in Test Two, because the 
change divergences warrant unorthodox reserve pass-through 
observations. 
 
 
Figure 4a. Changes in monetary base and foreign assets 
 
 
Figure 4b. Changes in monetary base and foreign assets 
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3.4. Test four: Net worth residual as a percentage of total assets 
Figure 5 offers a continuous look at the net worth residual as a 
percentage of total assets. In an orthodox currency board, the percentage 
should be from zero to no more than roughly 15 percent. When this 
condition holds, assets equal or slightly exceed liabilities. As previously 
mentioned, for an orthodox currency boards, the assets should be foreign 
rather than domestic. 
Figure 5 show several signs that the Tongan Board of Commissioners of 
Currency went against orthodox currency board standards. The net worth 
residual as a percentage of total assets dropped below zero three times 
from 1933 to 1987. Minor slipups came during 1936 and 1952, while a major 
drop occurred in 1975 and 1976. If we refer to Figure 1, we see that foreign 
reserves as a percentage of the monetary base was below 100 percent for 
each of the aforementioned years; moreover, when referencing Figure 4A, 
we can see a major divergence between the year over year changes in 
monetary base and net foreign assets. 
 
 
Figure 5. Net worth residual as a percentage of total assets 
 
Beginning around 1956, we see a swift change from a net worth residual 
of 5 percent or less of total assets to a volatile residual, generally exceeding 
5 percent. Passing 5 percent or 10 percent net worth residual as a 
percentage of total assets is unorthodox for Tonga specifically, because 
Tonga did not have 100 percent foreign assets as a percentage of the 
monetary base for almost the entire duration of the Commissioners of 
Currency after 1966. Some currency boards have consistently held foreign 
reserves up to 110 percent of monetary liabilities, in which case a 10 percent 
net worth residual is excusable; however, Tonga did not consistently hold 
foreign reserves above even 100 percent of the monetary base. In this case, 
any presence of excess net worth (when foreign assets are less than 100 
percent of monetary assets) must come from domestic assets, which is a 
characteristic of unorthodoxy. 
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4. Conclusion 
In consideration of our statistical tests and the legislative changes 
enacted by the Tongan government, it is logical to split our final 
consideration into two eras, pre-decimalization and post-decimalization. 
These two periods, 1919-1966 and 1966-1989, offer differing degrees of 
currency board orthodoxy and it is important to distinguish between them, 
as well as to consider the changes that caused these differences. An 
important constant throughout the lifetime of the Commissioners of 
Currency was the fixed exchange rate with the Australian currency. The 
Tongan currency adjusted to the ebbs and flows of the Australian monetary 
system from 1919-1989, which leaves an important variable constant in our 
analysis. This indicates a strong commitment to a fixed exchange rate; 
however, an orthodox currency board requires more than a fixed exchange 
rate. 
Despite our lack of data from 1919-1933 and 1941-1947, there is a 
reasonable argument for currency board orthodoxy at least for 1934-1966 
and probably for the whole period 1919-1966. Beginning with our first test, 
net foreign assets as a percentage of the monetary base were close to 
orthodox standards, with an average percentage was 99.3 percent. 
Although the average was almost 100 percent during this time, the 
percentage was below 100 for 14 of the 26 years for which we have data. 
These metrics suggest that there was not complete orthodoxy, but 
something close to it. Furthermore, if we look at domestic assets as a 
percentage of the monetary base, which should be zero, the yearly average 
is 6.4 percent during the period. Once again, this is not fully orthodox, but 
it is close to the acceptable range. As alluded to earlier, reserve pass-
through can be slightly misleading, especially if working with smaller 
numbers; thus, for practical reasons, we will use Test Three’s findings. 
While there are obvious deviations displayed in Figure 4B, the changes in 
monetary base and foreign assets are fairly close (0.86 correlation from 
1934-1966), given the obscurity of the reserve pass-through volatility. With 
these considerations, it is valid to say that the Tongan Board of 
Commissioners of Currency was not fully orthodox, but acted fairly close 
to it before decimalization.  
Comparing the metrics pre- and post-decimalization, the difference is 
dramatic, indicating that the system was no longer close to an orthodox 
currency board. Beginning with Test One, we see that there is a steep drop-
off. For example, the foreign assets as a percentage of monetary base metric 
average drops to 73.8 percent for the period 1966-1989. Although the 
Treasury Notes Act established that foreign reserves had to be equal to 75 
percent or more of the monetary base, the Commissioners of Currency on 
average did not even meet this threshold after 1966. Moreover, the 
domestic assets as a percentage of the monetary base rose to 35.9 percent 
during the same period. Both of these movements are massive shifts in the 
unorthodox direction. We will shift our focus to Test Three once more and 
see another deviation from orthodoxy. The correlation between changes in 
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the monetary base and foreign assets during the post-decimalization era is 
only 36.6 percent. All of these figures suggest that the Tongan 
Commissioners of Currency did not operate as an orthodox currency board 
or even close to it after 1966.  
The Board of Commissioners of Currency’s change in policy seems to 
have been related to the creation of the Commissioners of Coinage. There 
was no necessity that decimalization or the Commissioners of Coinage 
should have pushed the monetary authority in an unorthodox direction. 
Rather, it seems that they were coincidental with elements of a more 
discretionary monetary policy. Eventually, the Friendly Islands deemed 
that there was a need for more room for discretionary monetary policy and 
to abandon a system that was not working in an orthodox manner. In 1989, 
Tonga granted itself more monetary autonomy by creating a central 
banking authority, the National Reserve Bank of Tonga, which still exists 
today. 
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Appendix 
Tonga Currency and Legislation, 1906-1989 
This is a compact, chronological representation of important events, legislation, and 
developments that affected the Tongan currency and the Board of Commissioners of 
Currency (see also Krus and Schuler 2014: 233-235). 
 1906 - British and Australian currency made legal tender in Tonga 
 1919 - Board of Commissioners of Currency established and first notes issued 
 1926 - Government Savings Bank created 
 1935 - Treasury Notes Act passed, fixed the Tongan currency to Australian 
currency 
 1962 - Tonga Coinage Act passed to allow issuance of gold coins 
 1966 - Tonga decimalizes on the same day as Australia 
 1988 - National Reserve Bank of Tonga Act passed, establishing central banking 
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